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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This is an appeal from a judgment entered by the First 
Circuit Court, Cache County division, upon a jury verdict of 
guilty of the Logan City ordinance expired registration 
offense and from an earlier Decision excluding proffered 
evidence of gross ultra vires official misconduct in 
processing the charge and constituting a denxal of due 
process defense. This court has jurisdiction over this 
appeal under Rule 3 of R. Utah Ct. App. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Is Karen Thatcher not guilty of the expired vehicle 
registration charge because Logan City and the Circuit Court 
denied due process in employing forms and practices in her 
apprehension and prosecution which were not only in direct 
conflict with Utah Statutory requirements for those 
proceedings, but also constituted criminal prosecutorial 
practices denying constitutional due process and her right 
to a public jury trial? 
2. Did the court deny Karen Thatcher's right to a 
speedy trial? 
3. Does Sec, 77-7-18 - 21 deny due process because it 
prescribes citation contents designed to unfairly and 
involuntarily extract bail forfeitures and fines and because 
of facial threats of "discretionary" warrant issuance 
without fairly advising the citizens of the compulsory 
additional findings required before issuing warrants and 
because of vagueness and because it authorizes judicial 
process terms to describe the citation? 
RELEVANT STATUTES AND ORDINANCES 
A l l of t h e f o l l o w i n g s t a t u t e s a r e t a k e n from t h e Utah Code 
A n n o t a t e d 1 9 5 3 , a n d a r e r e f e r e n c e d i n t h i s B r i e f by 
u n d e r l i n e d s e c t i o n n u m b e r a s f o l l o w s : " 7 7 - 3 5 - 1 , 
U n d e r l i n i n g and b o l d f a c e emphas i s added . 
Criminal Statutes 
76-8-512. Impersonation of officer. A person is 
guilty of a class B misdemeanor if he iapersonates a 
public servant or a peace officer with intent to 
deceive another or with intent to induce another to 
submit to his pretended official authority or to rely 
upon his pretended official act. 
76-8-513. False judicial or official notice. A. 
person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor who, with a 
purpose to procure the compliance of another with a 
reguest made by the person/ knowingly sends, mails, 
or delivers to the person a notice or other writing 
which has no judicial or other sanction but which in 
its format or appearance simulates a summons, 
complaint, court order, or process, or an insignia, 
seal, or printed form of a federal, state, or local 
government or an instrumentality thereof, or is 
otherwise calculated to induce a belief that it does 
have a judicial or other official sanction. 
Criminal Procedural Rules 
77-35-1. Rule 1 - General provisions. (a) This 
chapter shall be known and may be cited as the "Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure.M 
(b) These rules shall govern the procedure in all 
criminal cases in the courts of this state except 
juvenile court cases. These rules are intended and 
shall be construed to secure simplicity in procedure, 
fairness in administration, and the elimination of 
unnecessary expense and delay. (Subsection (c) 
omitted) 
77-35-3. Rule 3 -- Service and filing of papers. 
(a) All written motions, notices and pleadings shall 
be filed with the court and served on all other 
parties. (Subsection (b) and (c) omitted) 
77-35-4. Rule 4 -- Prosecution of public offenses. 
(a) Unless otherwise provided, all offenses shall be 
prosecuted by indictment or information sworn to by a 
person having reason to believe the offense has been 
committed. 
(b) An indictment or information shall charge the 
offense for which the defendant is being prosecuted 
by using the name given to the offense by common law 
or by statute or by stating in concise terms the 
definition of the offense sufficient to give the 
defendant notice of the charge. An information may 
contain or be accompanied by a statement of facts 
sufficient to make out probable cause to sustain the 
offense charged where appropriate. Such things as 
time, place, means, intent, manner, value and 
ownership need not be alleged unless necessary to 
charge the offense. Such things as money, 
securities, written instruments, pictures, statutes 
and judgments may be described by any name or 
description by which they are generally known or by 
which they may be identified without setting forth a 
copy. However, details concerning such things may be 
obtained through a bill of particulars. Neither 
presumptions of law nor matters of judicial notice 
need be stated. (Subsections (c) - (k) omitted) 
77-35-5. Rule 5 -- Information and indictment, (a) 
Unless otherwise provided, all criminal prosecutions 
whether for felony, misdemeanor or infraction shall 
be commenced by the filing of an information or the 
return of an indictment. Prosecution by information 
shall be commenced before a magistrate having 
jurisdiction of the offense alleged to have been 
committed unless otherwise provided by law. 
(Subsection (b) omitted) 
77-35-6. Rule 6 — Warrant of arrest or summons, (a) 
Upon the return of an indictment the magistrate shall 
cause to issue either a warrant for the arrest or a 
summons for the appearance of the accused. 
Upon the filing of an information, "if" it appears 
from the information, or from any affidavit filed 
with the information, that there is probable cause to 
believe that an offense has been committed and that 
the accused has committed it, the magistrate shall 
cause to issue either a warrant for the arrest or a 
summons for the appearance of the accused. 
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If the defendant is a corporation, a summons shall 
issue. A warrant of arrest may issue in cases where 
the defendant has failed to appear in response to a 
summons or citation or thereafter when required by 
the court. When a warrant of arrest is issued, the 
amount of bail shall be fixed by the magistrate and 
stated on the warrant. 
(c) (1) The warrant shall be executed by a peace 
officer. The summons may be served by a peace 
officer or any person authorized to serve a summons 
in a civil action. 
(2) The warrant may be executed or the summons may 
be served at any place within the state. (Subsections 
(3) & (4) omitted) 
77-35-7. Rule 7 -- Proceedings before magistrate, (a) 
(1) When a summons is issued in lieu of a warrant of 
arrest, the defendant shall appear before the court 
as directed in the summons. (Subsections (a)(2) 
(f) omitted) 
Police Officer Jurisdiction Limits 
77-9-3. Authority of peace officer of this state 
beyond normal jurisdiction. (1) Any peace officer 
duly authorized by any governmental entity of this 
state may exercise a peace officer's authority beyond 
the limits of such officer's normal jurisdiction as 
follows: 
(a) When in fresh pursuit of an offender for the 
purpose of arresting and holding that person in 
custody or returning the suspect to the jurisdiction 
where the offense was committed; 
(b) When a public offense is committed in such 
officer's presence: 
(c) When participating in an investigation of 
criminal activity which originated in such officer's 
normal jurisdiction in cooperation with the local 
authority; 
(d) When called to assist peace officers of another 
jurisdiction. 
( 2 ) A1 i. y peace o f f" icer, prior to taking such 
authorized action, shall notify and receive approval 
of the 1 o c a 1 1 a w enforcemen t a utho r i t y
 / o r i f s u c h 
prior contact is not reasonably possible, notify the 
local law enforcement authority as soon as reasonably 
possible. Unless specifically requested to aid a 
police officer of another jurisdiction or otherwise 
as provided for by law, no legal responsibility for a 
police officer's action outside his normal 
jurisdiction and as provided herein, shall a11ach to 
the 1 oca 1 1 aw enforcement authorj t,y 
Citation Enabling Statutes . . 
77 -7 -18 . Citation on inisdemeanoi: ::>i: i nf ract i on 
charge• A peace officer, in 11eu o£ taking a person 
into custody, or any public official of any county or 
municipality charged with the enforcement of the law, 
aayissue and deliver a citation requiring any person 
sub.iect to arrest or prosecution on a misdemeanor or 
infraction charge to appear at the court o f th e 
magistrate before whom the person should be taken 
pursuant to I aw j f the person had been arrested. 
77-7 19• Appearance r equired by ci tation--Arrest for 
failure to appear--Col 1 ect:I on of bail amounts by 
Office of Recovery Se i v i ces • -Motor veh i c J e 
violations--Disposition of f i n .es and costs. 
(1) Persons receiving misdemeanor citations shall 
appear befor e the magistrate designated in t h e 
citation on or before the time and date specified in 
the citation. 
(2) No citatio n shall requii e a per son to appear 
sooner than five days or later than ] 4 days following 
its issuance. 
( 3 ) Any persoi I wI io receives a citation and who 
fails to appear on or before the time and date and at 
the court specified shall be sub.iect to arrest. The 
magistrate may issue a warrant of arrest and in, a, y 
order the Office of Recovery Services, within the 
Department of Social Services, to enforce collection 
of any bail amounts ordered by the court.. The Office 
of Recovery Services may only permanently withhold 
its CO'st of collection from any bail amount collected 
which is subsequently forfeited. If the collected 
bail amount is forfeited, the appropriate percentage 
or amoun t of that forfeited bail shall be distributed 
to the appropriate governmental entity as provided by 
law. It is the intent o f t h e Legislature t h a t 
appropriations to the Department of Public Safety 
r e f l e c t a p e r c e n t a g e of t h e f o r f e i t e d b a i l amounts 
c o l l e c t e d by t h e O f f i c e of Recovery S e r v i c e s p u r s u a n t 
t o t h i s s u b s e c t i o n and S e c t i o n 5 5 - 1 5 - C 8 , so t h a t t h e 
c o s t s o f l a w e n f o r c e m e n t may b e a d e q u a t e l y 
r e c o g n i z e d . 
( 4 ) E x c e p t w h e r e o t h e r w i s e p r o v i d e d by l a w , 
c i t a t i o n s o r i n f o r m a t i o n s , i s s u e d f o r v i o l a t i o n s of 
T i t l e 4 1 , Utah Code Anno ta t ed 1953 , s h a l l s t a t e t h a t 
t h e p e r s o n r e c e i v i n g t h e c i t a t i o n o r i n f o r m a t i o n 
s h a l l a p p e a r b e f o r e t h e m a g i s t r a t e n e a r e s t and most 
a c c e s s i b l e t o t h e p l a c e of v i o l a t i o n who h a s 
j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r t h e o f f e n s e c h a r g e d . I f t h e 
c i t a t i o n o r i n f o r m a t i o n i s i s s u e d f o r a v i o l a t i o n 
w i t h i n t h e g e o g r a p h i c a l b o u n d a r i e s o f a n y 
m u n i c i p a l i t y o r c o u n t y p r e c i n c t i n which a j u s t i c e 
c o u r t e x i s t s and i n which a j u s t i c e of the* p e a c e i s 
c u r r e n t l y s e r v i n g , s u c h c o u r t s h a l l be deemed t h e 
n e a r e s t most a c c e s s i b l e m a g i s t r a t e b e f o r e whom such 
p e r s o n s h a l l a p p e a r ; p r o v i d e d , h o w e v e r , t h a t 
c o n s i s t e n t w i t h S e c t i o n 7 8 - 4 - 5 , i n f o r m a t i o n s o r 
c i t a t i o n s i s s u e d f o r d r i v i n g unde r t h e i n f l u e n c e of 
a l c o h o l o r d r u g s , d r i v i n g w i th b lood a l c o h o l c o n t e n t 
of ,10% o r h i g h e r , and r e c k l e s s d r i v i n g may be f i l e d 
and t r i e d i n t h e c i r c u i t c o u r t i n t h e c o u n t y where 
t h e o f f e n s e o c c u r r e d w i t h o u t r e g a r d t o the* l o c a t i o n 
of t h e o f f e n s e w i t h i n t h e c o u n t y . 
(5 ) Any j u s t i c e of t h e p e a c e may, upon h i s own 
mot ion o r upon t h e mot ion of e i t h e r d e f e n s e a t t o r n e y 
o r p r o s e c u t i n g a t t o r n e y , t r a n s f e r c a s e s t o t h e 
n e a r e s t j u s t i c e of t h e p e a c e c o u r t o r t h e n e a r e s t 
c i r c u i t c o u r t w i t h i n s a i d c o u n t y , e x c e p t t h o s e c a s e s 
f i l e d under m u n i c i p a l o r d i n a n c e s . 
(6 ) I t s h a l l be t h e d u t y of c l e r k s and o t h e r 
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e p e r s o n n e l s e r v i n g t h e c i r c u i t , 
j u v e n i l e , and j u s t i c e c o u r t s t o e n s u r e t h a t a l l 
c i t a t i o n s f o r v i o l a t i o n of T i t l e 4 1 , U t a h Code 
A n n o t a t e d 1 9 5 3 , a r e f i l e d p r o p e r l y i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h 
t h e f o r e g o i n g s u b s e c t i o n and t o r e f u s e t o r e c e i v e 
c i t a t i o n s t h a t s h o u l d be f i l e d i n a n o t h e r c o u r t . 
F i n e s , f e e s , c o s t s a n d f o r f e i t u r e s i m p o s e d o r 
c o l l e c t e d f o r v i o l a t i o n s of T i t l e 4 1 , U tah Code 
A n n o t a t e d 1 9 5 3 , which a r e n o t f i l e d c o n t r a r y t o t h e 
f o r e g o i n g s u b s e c t i o n s s h a l l be p a i d o v e r t o t h e 
m u n i c i p a l i t y o r c o u n t y e n t i t l e d t o t h e same by t h e 
s t a t e , c o u n t y , o r m u n i c i p a l t r e a s u r e r who h a s 
r e c e i v e d such f i n e s , f e e s , c o s t s , o r f o r f e i t u r e s from 
t h e c o u r t which c o l l e c t e d them. Such a c c o u n t i n g and 
r e m i t t i n g o f a n y s u m s d u e h e r e u n d e r s h a l l b e 
a c c o m p l i s h e d a t t h e c l o s e of t h e f i s c a l y e a r of t h e 
m u n i c i p a l i t y o r c o u n t y w h i c h h a s r e c e i v e d f i n e s , 
..cca, «.u£>(-^ . oi . JJ. -s as a result of ^n V 
improperly filed citati [ ; 
7 / J.Q. Service of citation on clefei idant —Filing i n 
court--Contents of citations. (1) If a citation is 
issued pursuant to section 77-7-18, the peace officer 
or public official shall issue one copy to the person 
cited and shall within five days file a duplicate 
copy with the court specified in the citation. 
( 2 ) Each copy o f the citation issued u n d e r 
authority of this chapter shall contain: 
(a) The name of t he court before which the person 
is to appear; 
(b) The name o£ the person cited; 
(c) A brief description of the offense charged; 
( d ) T h e date, 1: i m e and place a t w h i c h t h e o f £ e n s e 
is alleged to have occurred; 
(e) The date on which the citation was issued; 
( £ ) T h e n a m e o £ t h e p e a c e officer o r ;• u . . 
official who issued the citation, and the name or \:.e 
arresting person if an arrest was made bv a private 
party and the citation was i ssuea . e - : taking 
the arrested person before a magistrate; 
(g) The time and date on or before - ^  
the person is to appear; 
( h ) The address of the court H r - ' :-
 r *= *. o 
to appear; 
( i ) A cer tif ication above ' :ie .; . .irtdt .. - :. 
officer issuing the citation in substantially the 
follQWinq language: "I certify tnat a copy of this 
citation or information (Sunons and Cotplaint) was 
duly served upon the defendant according to law on 
the above date and I know or believe and so allege 
that the above-named defendant did commit the offense 
herein set f Dr t h con trary to law. I further certi£y 
that the court '" o which 'he defendant has oeen 
directed tc appear is the -roper court f;ursuan^ 
section 77-7-21."; and 
( j ) A notice <" o n t a i n 11 * ^  ^oQta,iLJ.ai>, uie L W ± + \ -v , .. , 
languagei 
READ CAREFULLY 
This citation is not an information and will not be 
used as an information without your consent. If an 
information is filed you will be provided a copy by 
the court. You MUST appear in court on or before the 
time set in this citation. IF YOU FAIL TO APPEAR AN 
INFORMATION WILL BE FILED AND THE COURT MAY ISSUE A 
WARRANT FOR YOUR ARREST. 
77-7-21. Proceeding on citation--Voluntary forfeiture 
of bail--Information when required. (1) Whenever a 
citation is issued pursuant to the provisions of 
section 77-7-18, the copy of the citation filed with 
the magistrate may be used in lieu of an information 
to which the person cited may plead guilty or no 
contest and be sentenced or on which bail may be 
forfeited. With the magistrate's approval a person 
may voluntarily forfeit bail without appearance being 
reguired in any case of a class B misdemeanor or 
less. Such voluntary forfeiture of bail shall be 
entered as a conviction and treated the same as if 
the accused pleaded guilty. 
(2) If the person cited willfully fails to appear 
before a magistrate pursuant to a citation issued 
under section 77-7-18, or pleads not guilty to the 
offense charged, or does not deposit bail on or 
before the date set for his appearance, an 
information shall be filed and proceedings held in 
accordance with the Rules of Criminal Procedure and 
all other applicable provisions of this code, which 
information shall be deemed an original pleading; 
provided, however, that the person cited may by 
written agreement waive the filing of the information 
and thereafter the prosecution may proceed on the 
citation notwithstanding any provisions to the 
contrary. 
77-7-22. Failure to appear as misdemeanor. Any 
person who willfully fails to appear before a court 
pursuant to a citation issued under the provisions of 
section 77-7-18 is guilty of a class B misdemeanor, 
regardless of the disposition of the charge upon 
which he was originally cited. 
Ordinance of Logan City, Section: 
42-15-32. Violation of Promise to A p p e a r — 
Misdemeanor• 
(a) Any person willfully violating his written 
promise to appear in court, given as provided in this 
code, is guilty of a misdemeanor regardless of the 
disposition of the charge upon which he was 
originally arrested. 
(b) A written promise to appear in court may be 
complied with by an appearance by counsel. 
111111
 J'I ni| iii"! I'''!i' li 'Warran t E n a b l i n g S t a t u t e s 
78-32-1 • Act.3 ai id ::>missions constituting contempt • 
The following acts or omissions in respect to a court 
or proceedings therein are contempts of the at ithority 
of the court:: 
(3) Misbehavior in office, or other willful neglect 
or violation of duty by an attorney/ counsel, clerk, 
s he ri ff, o i other person appointed or e1e c t e d to 
perform, a judicial or ministerial service, 
(4) Deceit, or abuse of the process or proceedings 
of the court,, by a party to an action or special 
proceeding. 
( 5 ) Disobedience of anj 3 a w fit ml j \ i d gment, orde r or 
process of the court. 
(6) Assuming to be an officer , rtorney : 
counselor of a c o I i r t:,, a n d a cti n g a s . u <; n vithi
 Jt i 
authority. 
(12) Disobedience by a, n i n £ er i c r '::;.:. i 
magistrate or officer of the 3 awf u 1 judgrr.-n* , r^-ier 
or process of a superior court, or proceeding in .^ n 
action or special proceeding contrary to L^W, alter 
such action or special proceeding is removed from tne 
jurisdiction of such inferior tribunal, ^aaistra^e r 
officer.. Disobedience of the lawful orders or 
process of a judicial officer is also a contempt of 
the authority of such officer.. ( Subsecti ons 1,2,^ 
cmi*"on 
7 8 z~ 1 .«aiediate presence of cour t ; summary 
action—Without immediate presence; procedure. When 
a c 3 n t e m D C . . •. committed in the immediate vi ew arid 
presence of the court, or judge at chambers, i t may 
be punished summarily, for which an order must be 
made, r e c i t i n g the f a c t s as o cc ur r i n g i n s i i ch 
immediate view and presence, adjudging tha t th e 
person proceeded agains t i s thereby gu i l ty of a 
contempt, and that he be punished as prescribed :i n 
section 78-32-10 hereof. When the contempt is not 
committed in the immediate view and presence of the 
court or .judge at chambers, an a f f idavi t s h a l l be 
p r e s e n t e d to the c o u r t or judge of the fac t s 
c o n s t i t u t i n g the contempt, or a statement of the 
f a c t s by the r e f e r e e s or arb i t r a t o r s or o t h e r 
,j udj ci a 1 off icers . 
78-32-4 Warrant of ar i: est ,- commitment or order to 
show cause may i s s u e . When the contempt i s not 
committed in the immediate view and presence of the 
court or judge a warrant of attachment may be issued 
to bring the person charged to answer/ or, without a 
previous arrest/ a warrant of commitment may, upon 
notice/ or upon an order to show cause, be granted; 
and no warrant of commitment can be issued without 
such previous attachment to answer, or such notice or 
order to show cause. 
Utah and U.S. Supreme Court Law on Statutory Interpretation 
Quoting from Supreme Court of Utah, Deseret Savings Bank v. 
Francis et al. , 62 Utah 85, 217 P. 114 (1923): 
"In Supervisors v. U.S., supra, (4 Wall 435, 18 L.Ed. 
419) Mr. Justice Swayne, speaking for the court, 
said: 
"The conclusion to be deduced from the authorities 
is that, where power is given to public officers, in 
the language of the act before us, or in equivalent 
language — whenever the public interest or individual 
rights call for its exercise--the language * * * 
though permissive in form, is in fact peremptory. 
What they are empowered to do for a third person the 
law requires shall be done. The power is given, not 
for their benefit, but for his. It is placed with 
the depositary to meet the demands of right, and to 
prevent a failure of justice. It is given as a 
remedy to those entitled to invoke its aid, and who 
would otherwise be remediless. 
"In all such cases it is held that the intent * * * 
which is the test, was not to devolve a mere 
discretion, but to impose 'a positive and absolute 
duty.'" 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This de facto criminal action for expired registration 
was commenced in and on Main Street in Logan, Utah on 
September 4, 1987 by a police officer while impersonating an 
officer of the Circuit Court delivering to Thatcher a false 
Circuit Court judicial notice with numerous judicial titles 
and Circuit Court headings. A materially varied copy of the 
false judicial notice was filed by the policeman with the 
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witnesses. The arraignment was continued to December 1st so 
that a non-resident judge could be assigned and set a trial 
date. After the first arraignment where he was disqualified, 
Judge Perry directed the City Attorney to file an 
Information on the expired registration offense with no 
notice to Defendant. At the 12/1/87 continued arraignment, 
Judge Perry reported problems in locating an outside judge 
and suggested a withdrawal of the disqualification request. 
Thatcher refused, and Judge Perry directed filing of a 
written motion and affidavit on disqualification and 
continued the arraignment. Judge Perry said nothing about 
his 11/24/88 minute order for an Information on the expired 
registration count. 
At the 12/8/87 continued arraignment, Thatcher filed a 
written confirmation of the earlier motion for 
disqualification of resident judges and motion for a speedy 
jury trial. Judge Perry set a jury trial date of 1/27/88 
but made no mention in the record of his 11/24/87 order that 
the City Attorney file a new information and add the count 
on expired registration. However, on that same 12/8/88 
date, his unannounced order of 11/24/87 for an Information 
filing on expired registration was complied with by the City 
Attorney and sworn to before disqualified Judge Sorenson. 
Judge Perry sent a copy of the amended information to 
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At the close of the evidence at the trial/ Judge 
Baldwin dismissed the willful failure to appear count for 
lack of evidence of willfulness. He denied Thatcher's 
motion to dismiss the belated underlying expired 
registration count/ and the jury returned a guilty verdict 
under the limited evidence and instructions. This appeal is 
from the judgment entered on that guilty verdict and from 
the Decision excluding evidence of denial of due process. 
Statement of Facts 
On September 4/ 1987 Karen Thatcher was a petite/ 19 
year old high school graduate living at home with her 
parents and eight brothers and sisters in the Young Ward 
community south west of Logan. 
She was driving a car registered in her father's name 
which she believed was "legal" because she had personally 
had it "inspected" at Christmas-time before going to 
Connecticut as a "nanny" and had recently returned home. On 
her noon time return home from "Wendy's" with the kids, she 
was stopped by Logan City Police Officer Lisonbee on South 
Main (Tr. 6/15/88 pg. 89-90). 
Because she mistakenly believed that she had made the 
"car" legal/ she was surprised as Lisonbee proceeded, in a 
rude manner, to give her a "ticket" on a standard printed 
Logan City form for expired registration (See R. pg. 1 also 
Add. Al). Lisonbee handed the "ticket" to Karen and 
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other copies. 
On September 15th, a week before the appearance 
deadline, Karen went to a "Court House" and there renewed 
the expired registration (R. pg 104 also Add. B 8 ) . She 
returned home, mistakenly believing that she had complied 
with the confusing ticket and that the car was now fully 
legal again until Christmas-time inspection was due (Tr. 
6/15/88 pg 93). 
On Saturday morning, November 14, without any 
intervening notice or attempts at notice (Tr. 6/15/88 pgs 
72-73) Thatcher was arrested in her home by a Logan City 
policeman, Walcott, on a Bench Warrant issued by Circuit 
Court Judge Perry. The arresting officer was acting outside 
his jurisdiction, made the arrest in the home with 9, mostly 
younger, family members observing. Officer Walcott denied 
her right to counsel who was across the street on the 
premises, tightly handcuffed her behind her back, and seat-
belted her tightly into the car, causing welts and bruises 
on her wrists. As Walcott sped unlawfully off past her 
lawyer and to the jail, he questioned her without a Miranda 
warning as she wept from pain and fear. 
Walcott explained that the big hurry was that he had 
come there expecting violent resistance, though there was 
only a request for counsel, which he summarily and 
repeatedly denied. 
Her lawyer had called the jail before their arrival and 
been promised that the officer would call him upon arrival 
and before booking, but rather than do so, Walcott 
accelerated her place in the Perry Bench Warrant booking 
line on the pretext that it was a favor to get her through 
before her parents came to post bail. The jailer tried to 
console her weeping by stating that it was okay because it 
happened to lots of good people. However, when her parents 
came to post bail, a jailer recognized them and assured them 
that if the police had only known it was their daughter they 
would have called them, had them come in and post $100 bail 
and avoided the unpleasant arrest and jailing. They also 
told Thatchers that they only get those kind of warrants 
from Judge Perry. See R. pg. 30-32, Karen Thatcher 
Affidavit; R. pg. 33-35, Sidney Thatcher Affidavit; R. pg. 
36-38, David Daines Affidavit). 
The events that transpired in the Circuit Court between 
Lisonbee's service of the ticket "Summons" citation and the 
November 14th, outrageous Bench Warrant arrest and 
imprisonment were admittedly done without any notice or 
attempts of notification to Thatcher or her well-known 
family (See Tr. 6/15/88 pgs. 72-73). The original signature 
copy of the ticket captioned INFORMATION - AFFIDAVIT was 
filed by Lisonbee with the Circuit Court, but the affidavit 
notarization was always blank. 
On October 28th, the faulty form Bench Warrant was 
issued and endorsed for night service by Judge Perry and 
"x'ed" on the grounds of "failure to appear" (R. pg. 3). 
But it was two days later, on September 30/ that a "failure 
to appear" Information was filed (R. pg.2). 
The belated Information failed to allege the critical 
willful element in the failure to appear offense (Logan City 
Ordinance 44-15-32). The Information further alleged that 
Thatcher had been arrested and released on her promise to 
appear, which was another offense element and was known to 
be a patent falsity by all of the court personnel, policemen 
and prosecutors dealing with the whole ultra vires process. 
There was no information filed on the underlying expired 
registration charge until after the third arraignment 
session on December 8, 1987 at the initiation of Judge Perry 
after he had been disqualified as a witness. 
Judge Perry presided at the three arraignment hearings 
on 11/24/87, 12/1/87, and 12/8/87. At the first hearing, he 
acknowledged his disqualification when advised that both he 
and Judge Sorenson would be principle witnesses on the due 
process denial defense. A not guilty plea was entered, and 
a speedy jury trial was demanded. No information was filed 
on the underlying expired registration charge until after 
the last arraignment on 12/8/87. However, on 11/24/87, 
after the first hearing, Perry discovered the critical 
absence of a filed information on the underlying expired 
registration charge. This realization also illuminated to 
Perry a fatal flaw in the standard ultra vires practice. 
Though Thatcher had then appeared with counsel/ Judge Perry, 
without notice to Thatcher or counsel and having 
disqualified himself, nevertheless judicially directed the 
City Attorney to file information on the expired 
registration count. Perry then conducted two subsequent 
arraignments with Thatcher and her counsel present without 
notifying any one that he had previously ordered a second 
information filed. It was on the same day as the last 
arraignment on 12/8/87 that Judge Sorenson presided over the 
City Attorney's compliance with Perry's judicial demand for 
prosecution of that most innocuous of all class C 
misdemeanors. Perry then, on 12/10/88 casually mailed the 
amended information to Thatcher's counsel as though it was 
simply a technical, non-substantive amendment on which 
arraignment had already taken place. 
The jury trial was then unreasonably and prejudicially 
delayed without good cause from the first arraignment date 
when requested on 11/24/87 until finally held on 6/15/88. 
Judge Perry stretched his own estimation of timely trial to 
accommodate a non-resident judge as the later part of 
January and set the trial for 1/27/88. The assigned judge 
Baldwin, used the pretext of a simple issue determination to 
unreasonably delay the trial. The file reflects repeated 
protests and demands of Thatcher and her counsel which were 
later joined, after further unreasonable delays, by protests 
from the City Attorney and the clerks of Circuit Court. 
Judge Baldwin delayed the trial for the stated reason that 
he had difficulty deciding whether or not to allow Thatcher 
to present to the jury the evidence related to her due 
process denial defense. There is substantial evidence that 
Judge Baldwin motive was to suppress the public airing and 
embarrassment to his colleagues whose conduct had denied due 
process. 
Judge Baldwin, on the original trial date of 1/27/88 
and on Thatcher's motion suppressed also arrest statements 
of Thatcher on the grounds that the arresting officer had 
not only not given the Miranda warning, but had also denied 
the requested right to seek the counsel of her attorney who 
was on the premises at the time. On 5/9/88 Judge Baldwin 
decided to exclude evidence of due process denial, and the 
trial was held on that basis on 6/15/88. At the close of 
the evidence, Judge Baldwin granted Thatcher's motion to 
dismiss the failure to appear count on the grounds of no 
evidence of willfulness. Baldwin, however, denied 
Thatcher's motion to dismiss the expired registration count 
and on the restricted evidence allowed, and the instructions 
given, Thatcher was convicted by the jury of that charge. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Thatcher's primary claim is that the court erred by 
eliminating defense evidence of the ultra vires 
unconstitutional practices employed by the City and Circuit 
Court in the prosecution of this and other similar cases. 
This error deprived Thatcher of due process, statutory 
rights and her right to a public jury trial on her valid 
defenses. The Court should have allowed all the due process 
denial evidence on both counts and at the close of the 
evidence should have granted Plaintiff's motion to dismiss 
both counts 
Thatcher's other claims are that she was denied a 
speedy trial and that the state traffic citation enabling 
act is unconstitutional in denying due process because it 
permits citation wording which material and prejudicially 
misleads the cited citizens regarding their statutory and 
constitutional rights and liabilities and is 
unconstitutionally vague and authorizes a false judicial 
notice. 
ARGUMENT 
I. IT WAS GROSS ERROR TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE OF 
MULTIPLE CRIMINAL AND ULTRA VIRES "COLOR OF 
OFFICE" ACTS AND PRACTICES COMMENCING WITH A 
FALSE JUDICIAL NOTICE OF EXPIRED REGISTRATION 
AND RESULTING IN THATCHER'S FALSE ARREST AND 
IMPRISONMENT FOLLOWED BY OTHER DUE PROCESS 
DENIALS. THATCHER WAS THUS DENIED BOTH 
LIBERTY AND PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS; WAS 
DENIED A PUBLIC JURY TRIAL, AND STATUTORY 
PROTECTIONS BY GROSSLY OUTRAGEOUS OFFICIAL 
MISCONDUCT. 
The ruling of the Court, excluding due process denial 
evidence at the jury trial denied Defendant's fundamental 
due process right to present all her defenses to the jury 
and she clearly has required standing: 
"...The accused may challenge the validity 
of... practice, or policy involved in the 
course of criminal prosecution:" (16 C.J.S. 
Con. Law Sec. 73 pg. 201 & 202. Citing 
Berqer vs. State of Yew York, N. Y., 87 S.Ct. 
1873, 388 U.S. 41, 18 L.Ed. 2d 1040.) 
Here the false judicial notice and false impersonation 
were the basis for the prosecution and the false arrest and 
false imprisonment were a consequence of the process. 
"...The accused must show that his rights are 
adversely affected by it... (practice being 
challenged), whether or not it is the basis 
for the prosecution and such a showing is 
sufficient to support standing. <U. S. 
Groppi v. Wisconsin, 91 S.Ct. 490) (16C 
C.J.S. Con. Law Sec. 964 pg. 233) 
The ultra vires practices here all violated the 
aforesaid private rights protective state statutes which 
inherently constitute a violation of due process. 
"Due process may be effected by compliance 
as well as by non-compliance with a 
statute... or that the law (has) not been 
observed..." (16C C.J.S. Con. Law Sec. 964 
pg. 233) 
The outrageous false arrest and false imprisonment 
resulting from due process denials in this case demand the 
application of more extensive procedural safeguards than 
where less serious deprivations are involved. 
" . . . t h e m o r e s e r i o u s t h e d e p r i v a t i o n , 
( a r r e s t , i m p r i s o n m e n t ) t h e more e x t e n s i v e t h e 
p r o c e d u r a l s a f e g u a r d s which must p r e c e d e i t s 
i m p o s i t i o n , . . So t h e e x t e n t t o w h i c h 
p r o c e d u r a l due p r o c e s s mus t be a f f o r d e d a 
p e r s o n i s i n f l u e n c e d by t h e e x t e n t t o which a 
p e r s o n may b e c o n d e m n e d t o s u f f e r a 
g r i e v o u s l o s s ( a r r e s t , i m p r i s o n m e n t ) . . . " 
(16C C . J . S . Con. Law S e c . 967 p g . 248) 
The u l t r a v i r e s p r a c t i c e s employed h e r e were c a l c u l a t e d 
t o t h w a r t r a t h e r t h a n f u l f i l l t h e p u r p o s e s of t h e l aw. At a 
minimum d e g r e e o f c u l p a b i l i t y , t h e p r a c t i c e s w e r e i n 
r e c k l e s s d i s r e g a r d of t h e s t a t u t o r y p r o c e d u r a l r i g h t s of 
c i t i z e n s i n g e n e r a l , and T h a t c h e r . 
"The due p r o c e s s c l a u s e s r e q u i r e t h a t a power 
c o n f e r r e d by law be e x e r c i s e d j u d i c i o u s l y 
w i th an h o n e s t i n t e n t t o f u l f i l l t h e p u r p o s e 
of t h e law and i t i s a p a r t of t h e j u d i c i a l 
f u n c t i o n t o s e e t h a t t h e r e q u i r e m e n t i s 
m e t . . . " (16C C . J . S . Con. Law Sec 967 p g . 254) 
The v e r y mos t r i g i d s t a n d a r d s of due p r o c e s s a r e 
a p p l i c a b l e t o c r i m i n a l p r o c e e d i n g s i n g e n e r a l , a n d 
e s p e c i a l l y h e r e , where t h e l i b e r t y i n t e r e s t was o u t r a g e o u s l y 
t a k e n . 
" I n c r i m i n a l m a t t e r s , d u e p r o c e s s 
r e q u i r e m e n t s mus t be r i g i d l y a d h e r e d t o . 
Whether d e f e n d a n t ' s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t t o 
due p r o c e s s of law has been i n f r i n g e d i n a 
c r i m i n a l p r o s e c u t i o n w i l l be d e t e r m i n e d on 
t h e p a r t i c u l a r f a c t s of each c a s e , b u t any 
s u b s t a n t i a l d o u b t a s t o a p o s s i b l e 
d e p r i v a t i o n of d u e p r o c e s s of law mus t be 
r e s o l v e d i n f a v o r of d e f e n d a n t . " (16C C . J . S . 
Con. Law S e c . 992 p g . 350 & 351) 
The u l t r a v i r e s p r a c t i c e s and s t a n d a r d u l t r a v i r e s 
forms employed i n t h i s scheme a r e so f a r i n v i o l a t i o n of t h e 
legal protections and requirements that it appears there was 
a calculated long-standing plan with the very purpose of 
short cutting every legal and statutory protection and 
process. The whole plan appears to have been so outrageous 
as to be unbelievable, thus making it difficult to retain 
credibility and present the outrageous facts as they are. 
The triggering mechanism for the scheme are police officers 
who have been lead to believe that they have the power on 
the streets of Logan to there commence a criminal action by 
filling out and serving a false judicial notice and 
concurrently there serve upon the violator a Summons that 
has the full force of that powerful judicial process. 
Incredibly, the City Attorney also believers his police 
officers possess these judicial powers. 
The following excerpts are from the transcript of the 
trial and cross examination of Officer Lisonbee: 
Q Do you have authority to serve a summons 
out on the road? Do you have authority to 
issue and serve a summons? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q You have authority to issue a summons? 
A Yes, sir. 
MR. BRADY: Object to the relevancy of that, 
your Honor. 
THE COURT: Do you want to respond? 
MR. DAINES: What? 
THE COURT: Do you want to respond to the 
objection? 
MR. DAINES: Well, I'd simply say that I'm 
establishing the true character of the 
document that he served, and--
THE COURT: Objection's overruled. You may 
answer. 
MR. DAINES: Okay. 
Q (By Mr. Daines) Have you been through-
have you been through the POST training? 
A Yes sir. 
Q When did you go through POST training? 
MR. BRADY: Object to the relevancy, your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: Overruled. 
Q (By Mr. Daines) When did you go through 
POST? 
A 1984. 
Q During POST training, were you--you have 
said that you consider that you had authority 
to issue a summons; were you so advised in 
POST training, that you have authority to 
issue a summons from the Circuit Court, State 
of Utah, County of Cache, in the Municipal 
Department of Logan City, Cache County, Utah? 
MR. BRADY: Your Honor, I'm going to object 
to the relevance of that question. He's 
already testified that he's a duly qualified 
police officer, that he's got the authority 
to issue a summons, and that's what he did. 
I fail to see the relevancy of what he 
studied at POST. 
THE COURT: You can answer that yes or no. 
THE WITNESS: To the exact question, no, they 
did not tell me as a police officer of Logan 
City, County of Cache, you can. They stated 
yes, an officer in the State of Utah can. 
Q (By Mr. Daines) Can issue a summons? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q Have you received any training within the 
Logan City Police Department that also tells 
you that you have authority to issue a 
summons in a criminal case? 
A Not that I recall. 
(Tr. 6/15/88, pgs. 45-47) 
The simplest, most basic concepts of separation of 
powers dictate what is statutorily established in 77-35-1 -
7_, that a police officer belongs to the executive branch and 
has no power to issue Summons, though he may serve the same. 
The unbelievability of what was happening under the practice 
is identified by the fact that the highway patrol and Cache 
County Sheriff's Office, operating in the same community and 
through the same court and under the same State enabling 
legislation, avoided any claims to Summons issuance powers. 
See Add. A6 & A7. These open claims to judicial powers 
constitute a classic case of impersonation of a judicial 
officer calculated to induce others to submit to pretended 
official authority in violation of 76-8-512. 
The most cursory examination of the tainted Logan City 
ticket, especially when compared with the Highway Patrol and 
Cache County Sheriff's form, exposes a classic case of the 
most blatant possible violation of 77-8-513 prohibiting 
delivery of a false judicial notice. The Highway Patrol 
form and Cache County sheriff's form, which also operate 
under 77-7-20 never once characterizes the citation as a 
Summons. Logan City' tainted ticket, on the other hand, 
among other judicial titles, characterizes itself as a 
Summons twice in the caption, four times in the body on the 
front of the ticket and six times on the back. Court 
headings and captions are carefully avoided on the Highway 
Patrol and Cache sheriff's citation forms. The Logan City 
form, however, has a detailed and complete circuit court 
title in the format prescribed for formal pleadings and 
process of the circuit court and in the caption has a number 
where case numbers are required in formal court pleadings 
and is obviously calculated to give the appearance that the 
violator is a defendant in a case properly and legally filed 
in that court. 
While the third point hereafter deals with the claim to 
unconstitutionality of the citation enabling act because it 
permits the use of the word "information," it is clear that 
the Logan City form exceeds even the bounds apparently 
allowed for the use of that judicial process term. The top 
heading designates the ticket as an "information" as well as 
the caption on the court copy. The outrageousness of the 
use of the title of "information" on the face of the ticket 
is exposed by the following statement on the reverse side: 
"This summons is not an information and will not be used as 
an information without your consent." 
To compound the malicious inconsistencies on the face 
of the form, we examine its coercion in purporting to 
extract a consent that it may be used as an "information." 
On the face side now, above Karen Thatcher's signature which 
was extracted under the threat that if she did not sign it 
she would be arrested, is the statement explaining the dual 
purposes as both a "promise to appear" and a further 
agreement by her to waive the filing of a verified 
information and an election that the prosecution may proceed 
upon "this written summons to appear." This is the most 
blatant imaginable case of involuntary extraction of a 
consent and waiver of rights. What happened here, and in 
all similar cases, was that the arresting officer actually 
threatened her that if she did not sign the promise to 
appear, which also included a waiver of her rights, that she 
would be arrested. There was no way within the form to 
avoid arrest and yet refuse to waive her rights. Put 
another way, if she didn't sign it she would be arrested and 
if she did sign it she would waive her rights. 
The next step in the ultra vires process after the 
filing of the false judicial notice with the court and when 
the time passed for appearance was the issuance of the Bench 
Warrant from a printed form. See Add. Bl. This form of 
process, whether issued as in this case before the filing of 
the Information for failure to appear or after the 
Information for failure to appear is so blatantly ultra 
vires and totally beyond the jurisdiction and authority of 
the court as to be obvious. Sections 78-32-1, 3 & 4 are the 
enabling acts for issuance of Bench Warrants. That power is 
strictly limited to bringing a party who is in contempt of 
court before the court for disposition of a contempt of 
court charge. Contempt must have been either in the 
immediate presence of the court or committed outside the 
presence of the court, but in contempt of a valid, court-
issued summons or other court-issued process. It is obvious 
from the face of the Bench Warrant form utilized by the 
circuit court in this case that the alternative causes for 
the issuance of a Bench Warrant which may be checked on that 
ultra vires form, are not even authorized or enabled by 78-
32-1. The only possible conceivable basis for issuance of a 
warrant of arrest within this practice might be a warrant 
for arrest as an alternative to the issuance of a summons on 
the new and collateral failure to appear offense under 77-
35-6. This section prescribes the circumstances under which 
a magistrate may cause to issue either a warrant for arrest 
or a summons for the appearance of the accused. It is clear 
from a reading of subsection B that the court could only 
have issued a warrant for arrest in this case upon a finding 
based on some evidence that the service of a summons, rather 
than a warrant, would have resulted in "substantial danger 
of breach of the peace or injuries to persons or property or 
danger to the community. " It is clear that even if the 
judge had been following the proper procedure under that 
section, he did not have the evidentiary jurisdictional 
basis for the issuance of a warrant. We also argue that the 
judges endorsement allowing the warrant on a misdemeanor to 
be served at night must also be supported by some findings 
based on evidence. The other linkages in this ultra vires 
chain of practices include the total disregard of the 
underlying foundational offense once the charge of "failure 
to appear intervenes." Judge Perry mistakenly thought he 
could quietly correct this defect and even after his 
disqualification and without notice to counsel. He 
judicially prosecuted the underlying charge long after the 
false arrest and imprisonment was effected under the color 
of authority of his ultra vires Bench Warrant. 
Even though Karen Thatcher drove a car with an expired 
registration, the belated prosecution on that charge would 
not have occurred at all except for her plea of not guilty 
on the dependent failure to appear charge. This new added 
charge as a penalty for a not guilty plea, denied due 
process and constituted gross judicial misconduct wherein 
disqualified Judge Perry acted as a prosecutor. 
" S u b s t a n t i a l d i s c r e t i o n t r a d i t i o n a l l y 
a c c o r d e d a p r o s e c u t o r ( b u t n o t a j u d g e ) i n 
b r i n g i n g d e f e n d a n t t o t r i a l on c r i m i n a l 
c h a r g e s i s s u b j e c t t o t h e due p r o c e s s c l a u s e , 
which i s a s h i e l d a g a i n s t u n f a i r o r d e c e p t i v e 
t r e a t m e n t o f a c c u s e d by t h e g o v e r n m e n t . 
U n d e r t h e d u e p r o c e s s c l a u s e , d e f e n d a n t 
e n j o y s p r o t e c t i o n a g a i n s t d i s c r i m i n a t o r y 
p r o s e c u t i o n s a n d g o v e r n m e n t ( i n c l u d i n g 
j u d i c i a l ) m i s c o n d u c t , s i n c e t h e government 
may a c t i n such a d i s c r i m i n a t o r y f a s h i o n i n 
i t s e n f o r c e m e n t of t h e laws a s t o c o n s t i t u t e 
a d e n i a l o f d u e p r o c e s s . Due p r o c e s s 
p r i n c i p l e s c a n b e i n v o k e d t o b a r t h e 
p r o s e c u t i o n where i t r e s u l t s from i l l e g a l law 
e n f o r c e m e n t p r a c t i c e s . " (16C C . J . S . Con. Law 
Sec 993 pg , 354) 
Even i f t h e r e had been no o f f i c i a l m i s c o n d u c t p r i o r t o 
T h a t c h e r ' s f i r s t a r r a i g n m e n t on t h e f a i l u r e t o a p p e a r 
c h a r g e P e r r y ' s i n i t i a t i o n of p r o s e c u t i o n a t t h a t p o i n t on 
t h e u n d e r l y i n g o f f e n s e h a s e v e r y a p p e a r a n c e o f 
v i n d i c t i v e n e s s t o p u n i s h h e r f o r h a v i n g p l e a d e d n o t g u i l t y 
and therefore also offends due process especially where he 
was disqualified: 
"Prosecutorial (and judicial) vindictiveness 
can be an affront to due process... 
".•.successive prosecutions for crimes 
arising out of the same transaction may 
constitute harassment in violation of due 
process... 
The standard for determining prosecutorial 
vindictiveness, as bearing on due process 
rights of defendant, is whether there is a 
realistic likelihood of vindictiveness for 
the prosecutor's (or judges) augmentation of 
charges... 
The presumption of an improper vindictive 
motive has been applied where a reasonable 
likelihood of vindictiveness exists." 
(16C C J . S . Con. Law Sec 994 pg. 355 &. 356 
also Thiqpen v. Roberts, Miss. 104 S.Ct. 
2916.) 
"To punish a person because he has done what 
the law plainly allows him to do (plead not 
guilty to failure to appear) is a due process 
violation of the most basic sort and the 
defendant's right to due process of law is 
violated where the prosecution increases the 
severity of the alleged charges in response 
to the exercise of a constitutional or 
statutory right." (16C C J . S . Con. Law S&c. 
994 pg. 356) 
"In various instances it has been held that 
the government involvement in a criminal 
enterprise was so outrageous so as to violate 
the fundamental fairness, and the universal 
sense of justice mandated by the due process 
clause, while in other cases, the government 
involvement has been held not so outrageous 
as to constitute the violation of due 
process." (16C C J . S . Con. Law Sec 995 pg. 
357 & 358) 
It is certainly possible that these unconstitutional 
practices involving repeated and regular misdemeanors of 
false impersonation, false judicial notices, ultra vires 
warrants and false arrests and official misconduct for the 
apparent purpose of expeditious collection of fine and 
forfeiture revenues and for artificial self-serving 
enhancement of crime and jail loading statistics could be 
viewed as sufficiently outrageous to constitute a separate 
grounds for due process violations. 
While it is clear that the Logan City ticket is a false 
judicial notice under 76-8-513 and exceeds the permitted 
verbiage of a citation under 77-7-20 its employment also 
constitutes the common law tort of an abuse* or malicious 
abuse of process. There can be no doubt that the prohibited 
circuit court heading on the ticket and its repeated use of 
"Summons," Information and references that it may be the 
basis for issuance of a warrant were calculated to obtain a 
result to generate a type of fine and forfeiture generating 
fear, and false arrest and imprisonment which the legal 
"citation" was not intended by law to effect. 
"It has been held that an "abuse" or 
"malicious abuse" of process is its 
employment to obtain a result which the 
process was not intended by law to esffect. 
For purposes of this tort the word process 
may encompass a range of court procedures 
incident to the litigation. The tort is not 
limited to the issuance of process, but 
extends to its oppressive use after 
issuance." (72 C.J.S. Sec 106 PROCESS pg. 
694) 
In this case even the standard failure to appear 
Information filed October 30, 1987, two days after the Bench 
Warrant had been issued, was so deficient that it totally 
failed to give the court jurisdiction of that proceeding. 
"Willfulness" of the non-appearance is the central and 
material element of the crime under both the Logan City 
ordinance charged here (Logan City Ordinance 42-15-32) as 
well as the state code version under 77-7-22. That 
ordinance and statutory key element is not even one of the 
allegations in the form information and there is no space 
for it on the form (R. pg . 2 also Add. B2). The ordinance 
offense also requires that there must have been an original 
arrest and a release on a written promise prior to the 
willful failure to appear crime. 
42-15-32 Violation of Promise to Appear--
Misdemeanor. 
(a) Any person wilfully violating his 
written promise to appear in court, given 
as provided in this code, is guilty of a 
misdemeanor regardless of the disposition of 
the charge upon which he was originally 
arrested. 
(b) A written promise to appear in court may 
be complied with by an appearance by counsel. 
(Logan City Ordinance 42-15-32) 
Judge Perry, even after the filing of the information on 
October 30, acted in total absence of jurisdiction even on 
the failure to appear charge on the following independent 
grounds: 
F i r s t , t h e I n f o r m a t i o n f a i l e d t o a l l e g e t h e o r d i n a n c e 
r e q u i r e d and c e n t r a l m a t e r i a l e l e m e n t of " w i l l f u l n e s s . " An 
I n f o r m a t i o n mus t a l l e g e a l l t h e m a t e r i a l e l e m e n t s of t h e 
crime before jurisdiction is conferred on the court under 
77-35-4. 
Secondly, while the Information, on its face, does 
allege that the Defendant had been arrested and released on 
her promise to appear, she in fact had not been arrested. 
In this case and in the context of the standard practices of 
the Logan City police department and the Circuit Court one 
is lead to the inevitable conclusion that the court and the 
complaining police officer knew as a matter of fact that the 
ticket had been issued in a run of the mill, no arrest, 
"citation" issuance scenario. The court cannot gain 
jurisdiction by accepting an Information statement of an 
element of the offense which the Court knows does not exist. 
The most charitable view that one can possibly take of 
the state of the collective official minds that led to this 
unconscionable liberty and property extraction scheme is 
that they subjectively interpreted their statutory powers to 
provide the maximum possible expedience to their objectives 
of extracting money and liberty. They had to totally 
disregard citizens' rights' protective interpretations of 
these power enabling statutes. However, the law is clear 
that in this case of aggravated deprivation of liberty 
interests or where lesser protected common law property 
rights are being affected, the protection of those 
fundamental constitutional rights requires, in all cases, 
strict and rigid statutory interpretations for the benefit 
of the citizens and protection of their rights rather than 
the officially expedient interpretation applied here by the 
officials with reckless self-serving abandon at as minimum 
degree of culpability. 
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah has clearly 
enunciated this individual rights protective principle of 
interpretation in Deseret Savings Bank vs. Francis, 62 Utah 
85, 217 P. 1114 (1923) quoting from Supervisors vs. U.S., 4 
Wall 435, 18 L.Ed. 419 as follows: 
"The conclusion to be deduced from the 
authorities is that, where power is given to 
public officers, in the language of the act 
before us, or in equivalent language --
whenever the public interest or individual 
rights call for its exercise -- the 
language***though permissive in form, is in 
fact peremptory. What they are empowered to 
do for a third person the law requires shall 
be done. The power is given, not for their 
benefit, but for his. It is placed with the 
depositary to meet the demands of right, and 
to prevent a failure of justice. It is given 
as a remedy to those entitled to invoke its 
aid, and who would otherwise be remediless. 
"In all such cases it is held that the 
inten t *** which is the test, was not to 
devolve a mere discretion, but to impose 'a 
positive and absolute duty.'" 
II. THE COURT DENIED THATCHER'S RIGHT TO A SPEEDY 
JURY TRIAL. 
Judge Perry responded to Thatcher's express written 
demand for a speedy jury trial by directing assignment of a 
non-resident judge for a jury trial in "late January." (R. 
pg. 11 Minutes) The trial was set on January 27, (R. pg. 16 
Notice) and was continued by Judge Baldwin until June 15. 
He simply couldn't or wouldn't make up his mind as to 
whether he would allow Thatcher to present her extensive 
evidence and official adverse witnesses regarding her due 
process denial defenses. It took him until May 9th to rule 
to exclude the evidence. (R. pg. 64 & 65 Decision) 
The erroneous reasons he gave for the belated 
exclusionary ruling suggest the true motives for both the 
unconscionable delay and the exclusions (R. pg . 64-65 
Decision). 
First, as Point I demonstrates, he erroneously, but 
successfully, shielded the implicated malfeasant subpoenaed 
public officials from a local public jury trial expose' of 
their very relevant, but gross official misconduct 
practices. 
Secondly, he attempted to shunt those officially 
embarrassing due process defense proofs out of a jury trial 
and into (non-criminal) civil status as questions of law for 
a judge and not for a jury. Though he may have ruled in her 
favor, this maneuver would have denied Thatcher's right, Ir^ 
a criminal case, to present all of her defense evidence to a 
jury of her peers regardless of the public embarrassment to 
the non-defendant officials who had been subpoenaed. 
Thirdly, in his Decision, the Judge actually revealed 
his "official embarrassment" cover-up by excluding the 
evidence on the "grounds of prejudice, confusion, or a waste 
of time," in addition to its relevance (R. pg. 64 6c 65 
Decision). 
It is fundamental that only prejudice (embarrassment) 
to the Defendant charged with the crime is grounds for 
exclusion of relevant evidence. Any prejudice 
(embarrassment) would have been to her uncharged official 
accusers and judges. His ruling was protecting officialdom 
from prejudice and embarrassment and had quite the opposite, 
effect of "prejudicing" the charged Defendant. 
In any event, Judge Baldwin spent two terms of court 
agonizing over whether he would allow a full dress expose' 
of gross misconduct of public officials in the very court 
rooms where they had and would likely continue to practice 
their judicial misconduct, or provide a cover for his 
colleagues. Agonizing as this decision must surely have 
been, it is clear that under these circumstances it was a 
denial of Karen Thatcher's constitutional right to a speedy 
jury trial. See Constitution of Utah, Art. I Sec. 12 and 
the U. S. Constitution Amendment VI. 
III. THE CITATION ENABLING ACT IS SO PREJUDICIALLY 
MISLEADING AND VAGUE IN DESCRIBING RIGHTS AND 
LIABILITIES THAT ALL OR SUBSTANTIAL PORTIONS 
ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 
A careful analysis of the misdemeanor "citation" 
enabling act found in 77-7-18 to 23 and compared with 76-8-
512 & 513 on false impersonation and false judicial notice 
crimes, demonstrates the fine line the legislature was 
trying to walk. Their primary objective was to enable non-
judicial peace officers maximum public "scare" factor in 
inducing citation compliance. They faced constitutional 
invalidity should the "citation" content go over the line in 
its appearance as either a false "judicial" notice or create 
an inordinate and false fear that a warrant may issue even 
though unspecified statutory protective pre-conditions to 
warrant issuance must first be met. Under general law and 
76-8-512 & 513 a peace officer could issue a citation or 
serve a summons previously issued by a court. However, he 
would be committing two class B misdemeanors if he were to 
claim (judicial) authority to issue a summons, complaint or 
information and deliver the same. 
The first citation enabling section, 77-7-18 carefully 
avoids any judicial process terminology and stays 
exclusively with "citation." However, in 77-7-19 (4) the 
reference is to a "citation or information," the latter 
being a hard judicial process term though 77-7-20 (j) 
confusingly then requires wording that "This citation is not 
an "information, " To multiply the confusion, the preceding 
sub paragraph (i) classifies the notice as a citation, but 
then prescribes a whole series of alternative judicial 
process terms for the notice: 
" I certify that a copy of this citation, or 
information (summons or complaint) was duly 
served... " 
Then follows the following: 
"READ CAREFULLY" 
This citation is not an information and will 
not be used as an information 
Section 77-7-21 compounds the inconsistency by clearly 
identifying an winformation" as a separate and later process 
that may be filed with the Court if specified options are 
exercised by the citation recipient. 
The Logan City traffic ticket form is so clearly a 
false judicial notice that its examination does little to 
aid in demonstrating the unconstitutional elements in the 
citation enabling act (Add. A1-A5). 
The Highway Patrol citation (Add. A7), compared with 
the sheriff's form (Add. A6) reveal two divergent attempts 
to walk the fine line between a "citation" and a false 
judicial notice. 
The Highway Patrol form excludes anything that may have 
the appearance of court captions or jurats that could be 
construed as indicia of judicial process. The enabling 
statutes do not expressly address these indicia of judicial 
process, but the false judicial notice statutes inherently 
prohibits them. The sheriff's form raises a red or gray 
flag in this respect by highlighting a notary jurat which 
seems to have no purpose other than to create an 
unauthorized judicial process scare. 
The Sheriff's office titles its ticket form, however, 
as a "CITATION INFORMATION." This clear incursion into 
judicial process terminology is expressly authorized by the 
unconstitutional enabling act (77-7 - 20 ) and directly 
conflicts with the letter and spirit of the false judicial 
notice statute (77-8-513). 
In apparent recognition of this problem with the 
enabling act and presumably with the aid of the Attorney 
General, the Highway Patrol uses the title of "CITATION" 
only and does not use the legislatively authorized OR 
INFORMATION" title. 
The 77-7-20 legislatively authorized citation statement 
that, absent a timely appearance, an Information "will be 
filed" and that the court "may" issue an arrest warrant is a 
grossly misleading scare. A form of this false judicial 
threat is on the reverse side of all three police agency 
versions of the tickets (R. pg. 1 ) . 
An honest, straight forward due process reference as to 
what may transpire in the judicial processing of a failure 
to appear on the ticket would need to contain the following 
statements in order not to be materially and prejudicially 
misleading to its recipients: 
"Informations" may be filed on the offense 
charged and a separate failure to appear 
offense if you failed to appear as promised. 
Thereafter the court will issue a summons or, 
may upon finding probable risks of dangers, 
in lieu of a summons issue a warrant for your 
arrest." 
Anything less is a material misleading scare violating 
due process. The "will" file an information statement gives 
the false impression that there is no prosecutorial 
discretion to refuse to prosecute under any circumstances. 
The commonly used option of giving non-judicial notices and 
demands is totally absence. The "warrant may issue" 
statement deceitfully omits the "summons" process which is 
the compulsory formal process absent a finding based on 
evidence of likelihood of dangers specified in 77-35-6 (b). 
The insidious evil which this misleading legislation 
spawned is evident in the incredible false arrest and false 
imprisonment resulting in this case. It is likely that the 
police, prosecution and Judge Perry erroneously looked to 
this unconstitutional public scare tactic as enabling them 
to do what they did in this expedient, but ultra vires, fine 
and forfeiture collection and liberty extraction scheme. We 
will never know how many people out of the fear generated by 
these misleading judicial process words decided to pay fines 
o r f o r f e i t u r e s when t h e y had a good d e f e n s e . B u r e a u c r a t i c 
economy a n d f i s c a l e x p e d i e n c e c u t d e e p l y i n t o f u n d a m e n t a l 
i n d i v i d u a l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s u n d e r t h i s l e g i s l a t i o n . 
W h a t ' s w o r s e i s t h a t b e c a u s e you r e a l l y c a n ' t s u c c e s s f u l l y 
f i g h t a c l e a r l y wrong c i t y h a l l , we w i l l l i k € * l y n e v e r know 
o r b e a b l e t o t a b u l a t e how many c i t i z e n s h a v e b e e n f a l s e l y 
a r r e s t e d a n d i m p r i s o n e d b y t h i s m a l f e a s a n t s t a n d a r d 
o p e r a t i n g p r o c e d u r e . 
CONCLUSION 
T h i s C o u r t s h o u l d r e n d e r a j u d g m e n t o f n o t g u i l t y on 
t h e e x p i r e d r e g i s t r a t i o n o f f e n s e o n t h e g r o u n d s t h a t 
T h a t c h e r w a s d e n i e d d u e p r o c e s s o f l a w , d e n i e d a s p e e d y 
t r i a l , a n d t h a t t h e c i t a t i o n e n a b l i n g s t a t u t e s a r e 
u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i n w h o l e o r p a r t . 
R e s p e c t f u l l y s u b m i t t e d , 
Davier t c r - D a i n e s 
Attorney for Defendant Appellant 
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UTTHS CIRCUIT CdURT, STATE OF UTAH, COUNTY OF C/fcttS 
IN THE MUNICIPAL DEPARTMENT OF LOGAN CITY, CACHE COUNT*, UfAH 84321 
No-C- 82546«— 
SUMMONS 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF CACHE 
CITY OF LOGAN 
IS V RiAfl 
Th*» undersigned, being duly sworn, upon/ his ooth deposes and soys: 
On the 
Na 
.day o f . / >£> 
:/ J*-
a m e . 
Street . 
City 
Age 
19ft '
 n t OS &f n A.M. ^ J P.I 
' Jt"bst_ (Please print) J First ^ Middle 
^ _ i _ _ _ Birth D a t e _ 
. State . <-, •?£•« \ 
. te 
// 
Driv t i r No 
Veh 
\ ' i 
Make V ^ \ ^ 
S e x . Q Mole J S l ^ e r n o ' e 
/ 
/ ^ 7/ 2 9-/7 "? S lo t . ( «, ?<rt • . £ } . O p e r . O Chouf 
Ik. Nn A /•' I . / O 2St ^,.^A: <" 
. S t y l e . . Color. A y,.. < 
Upon a public highway, namely at ( locat ion) . /o& &?<.. K "•* o /1 
did unlawfully operate the above described vehicle in the city, county and stote aforesaid and 
then and there commit the following offense: 
did 
3 C 
o a> 
<J -o 
r l 
SPEEDING m.p.h. in m.p.h. zone. 
Improper LEFT TURN D No signal • Cut corner D From 
wrong lane 
Improper RIGHT TURN • No signal Q , n t o w r o n 9 Q F r o m wrong 
lane lane 
Q Disobeyed TRAFFIC O Flashing red 
CONTROL SIGNAL 
Q Steady red 
O Improper backing 
O Too fast for existing conditions 
Disobeyed STOP SIGN • Wrong place • Wolk speed Q Faster 
Improper PASSING D At Intersection Q Cut in • Wrong lane 
Q At Ped. Q Across 
______ X wa lk physical bar. • On right 
FAILURE TO YIELD 
Other violations: (described* t 
FOLLOWING TOO CLOSELY 
{£+, 1 + ~?y* 
*p f f~ 
• Ped. • Veh 
7/xS 
in violation of the (State Statute) (City Ordinance) in such case mode and provided. 
it 
In
cr
ea
se
d 
>f 
V
io
la
ti
o
n
 
C
on
di
tio
ns
 
th
e
 
"
Se
rio
us
ne
ss
 
c
 
SLIPPERY • Ram 
PAVEMENT •
 S n o w 
D Ice 
DARKNESS Q
 N i g h t 
D Fog 
• Snow 
CD Cross 
OTHER TRAFFIC Q Oncoming 
PRESENT • Pedestrian 
*, • Same Dire< 
AREA: UlBusi ness • Indu 
HIGHWAY TYPE: • 2 lane 
CAUSED PERSON 
TO DODGE 
a Pedestrian ' 
• J Driver 
• JUST MISSED 
ACCIOENT •-* 
:tion 
strial • School 
• 3 lane Q 4 U \%
 
Ty
pe
 
A
cc
id
en
t 
| 
/ • PD D PI D Fatal 
I • Ped. • Veh 
• Q Hit fixed °°iect 
• • Right Angle 
| D Heod on 
Sideswipe J 
i Q Ran off Road 
f 0 Intersection 
Vf") Rear end 
• Residential 
H " 4 lane divided 
I certify that a copy of this summons was duly served upon the defendant according to law on 
the above date and I know or bel ieve and so al lege that the above-named defendant did 
commit the offense herein set forth contrary to law. I further certify thaMhe court to which the 
defendant has been directed to appear is the proper court pursuant to /Section 77-7-21 
.(SK.77.7-,9). / ~T -? 2&0" 
/ / * , *^ * 
*h»* dnyf t f ^ i g g . 
Sworn and subscribed to before m e 
. Circuit 3udq 
" (Signature and identification of 4 
otfiemt at nth»r complainant^ ^ 
C~3 
1 < 
OO 
r\> 
b* (mnf 
^ ^ R T A P f E A ^ N C i - J E 
:AD0RESSrOF COURT aTOERIC OFFICE: .,_. _ ^QGAN>UT> _ 
^PROMISE TO APPEAR'IN j I A I D COLH«f O'W B U K W U ML V w F U M E ' V U ' l U PLACE to answer tcr the ^  - ^ ^ 
Sboverxharge, .and fu f tb f>ogree to w a i v e the f i l ing,ofa ; J ^rf f1ed mformatiorhand elecJ-that the "_!_. ^~:''M^jf2 
pfosecutiorvcaoy proceed ti^on this writtef>_$urnrnor»s topppeaV. 
_day of jKfy? r^fliwSlL^ DRAA. ^ f ^ ^ 
: 140 NO f^HlsT W^T tOGAN; UTAH^'^%^^ 
INSTRUCTIONS - REAP C/«?fiFUU*Y, 
SIGNING THIS SUMMONS IS NOT AN ADMISSION « F GUILT. HOWEVEVgflFYOU 
REFUSE TO SIGN, THE OFFICER MUST TAKE YOU INTO CUSTODY WktlriE YOU 
MUST POST BAIL BEFORE YOU WILL BE RELEASED. 
Before entering Court you must parent your copy of the summons to the Clerk of the 
Court at which time you will be instructed as to whether the violation charged may be 
disposed of by posting bail or forfeiting bail. If bail can be forfeited to dispose of the 
chargeyou may post the bail on or before the court appearance date on your summons 
during the regular hours of the Clerk's office. 
If you disagree with the charges or are so instructed by the Clerk you must personally 
appear, or by counsel appear, in Circuit Court at the date and time indicated by the 
officer on the summons, and enter a piea of "NOT GUILTY" and a trial date will be set. 
If you forfeit bail or enter a piea of guilty in Court or are found guilty after a trial, the 
forfeiture or conviction will be reported on ail moving vioiationstothe State Department 
of Public Safety, Driver's License Division, ana will be recorded against your driving 
record. 
This summons is not an information ana will not be used as an information without your 
consent. If an information is filed you will be provided a copy by the court. You MUST 
appear in court on or before the date and time set in this summons. IF YOU FAIL TO 
APPEAR. AN INFORMATION WILL BE FILED AND THE COURT MAY ISSUE A 
WARRANT FOR YOUR ARREST. FAILURE TO APPEAR as promised on the reverse 
side hereof or failure to post bail on or before such appearance date, where forfeitures 
are permitted, constitutes a separate and additional offense, a misdemeanor for which 
the law provides a penalty up to 6 months in jail or S299.00 line or both. 
COURT ACTION: Fine $ Suspended S 
days in County Jail days suspended. 
Delay in execution to the day of ~ 198 
Trial Date day of 198 at D a.m • p.m. 
Bail setS Bail Forfeited 
Receipt No. Date Amount $ 
CIRCUIT COURT: 140 NORTH 1ST WEST Clerk Office Hours: 
Logan, Utan 84321 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. 
Mondays tnrough Fridays 
except legai holidays. 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT. STATE OF UTAH. COUNTY OF CACHE 
IN THE MUNICIPAL DEPARTMENT OF LOGAN CITY. CACHE COUNTY. UTAH 84321 
rtlTMCORCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH, COUNTTOFC 
IN THE*:.:-. ..CIPAL DEPARTMENT OF LOGAN CITY, CACHE COUNTY, urAH 84321 
No.C- 82546 
INFORMATION - AFFIDAVIT 
mg duly sworn, upon/his ooth deposes and says: €J d ^ f ~l~ST 
. D A.M. ^ f . M 
......
 > y ^ / W i ^ ' /^^e*y ^= 
_ / £ s ^ (Please print) / F.rst ^ |~> M . ^ l e f 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF CACHE }• ss 
CITY OF LOGAN 
The undersigned, being duly sworn, upon/his ooth deposes and says: 
On the f day 
Name. 
.,. NO W7(zfr/yz 
City. 
Age 
Driv. Lie. No 
Veh 
Make 
. S t a t e . i£ 
Sex:D/Aole « J y ™ 
V lw^ 
Upon a public highway, namely at ( locat ion) . 
male 
per. [ I Chouf. 
Y e a r i ^ _ ( _ 
^A,r » * O C 7 ( J • - Colorr/^f ^ 
did unlawfully operate the above described vehicle in the city, county and state aforesaid and did 
then and there commit the fol lowing offense: 
3 C 
o <o 
SPEEDING m.p.h. in m.p.h. zone. 
Improper LEFT TURN D No signal D o ut corner Q From 
wrong lane 
Improper RIGHT TURN Q No signal Q ,nt<> wrong Q From wrong 
lane lane 
0 Oisobeyed TRAFFIC Q Floshing red 
CONYROL S IGNAL 
D Steady red 
Q Improper backing 
D Too fast for existing conditions 
Oisobeyed STOP S IGN Q Wrong place • Walk speed Q Foster 
Improper PASSING • At Intersection Q Cut in Q Wrong lane 
Q At Ped. D Across 
X walk physical bar. • O n right 
FAILURE TO YIELD • Ped. • V e h . FOLLOWING TOO C L O ^ L Y Q 
•2^,/tf># Other violations: (describe) j £ / *J ^ A ^ t ^ ^ S l I 
I in vtolc/ion of the (State Statute) ( C i t ^ O r d i n a i * e A ^ \ J t W a s A j ^ a d e and provided. I 
DARKNESS 
OTHER T R A F F j r V g l i n c o m i n g 
P R E S E N T C X Q * a Pedestrian 
^g D Some Direction 
AREA: CTVBusiness C ] Industrial 
H I G H W A Y TYPE: • 2 lane Q 3 lane 
Head on 
Sideswipe 
*~ f D Rcm off Road 
Q Intersection 
Rear end 
• School • Residential 
LJ 4 lane 'H^"4 lane divided 
I certify that a copy of this summons was duly served upon the defendant according, to law on 
the above date and I know or be l ieve and so a l lege that the above-named defendant did 
commit the offense herein set forth contrary to law. I further oe^ify t h a y m e ^ o u ^ ' t o which the 
defendant has been directed to appear is the propery^ouil pursyppr^to ibection 77-7-21 
(SK. 77-7-19). / / S^'fi' %/?<//-
Sworn and subscribed to before m e 
(Signature and identification of 4. 
officer or other complainant) "^ 
^at^S^UA. DP.M. - C O U R T APPEARANCE: 
*DDRESS OF COURT & CLERK OFFICE: 140 N 6 * T H 1ST WEST i f l f i A N , UTAH. 
T PROMISE TO APPEAR I N SAID COU«Pl )W BUWkAU A I i>AlD l i M f A N U PLACE to answer to the 
3bove charge, and further agree to w a i v e the f i l ina of a~verft*d infnrmntinn ««<-! »i*w» ihm t k -
C~3 
I 
OO 
ro 
en 
> w . «w «-»i^*^ n * _ t * H M V i i i \ I I V 1 * 
IE CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OE^TAHt COUNTY OF C 
IN THE 7*o.-.C1PAL DEPARTMENT OF LOGAN CITY. CACHE COUNTY, UTAH 84321 
, No.C-82546 
I " INFORMATION - AFFIDAVIT 
STATE Of: UTAH 
COUNTY OF CACHE 
CITY OF LOGAN 
The unde/s 
On t h e . 
l i gned . b e i n g duly^syyorn. upoor his o a t h deposes and says: 
^ J> <? _r ^ S "— ^ f 
• A~XJ /•.*/ V - "^ *»*^ *** TOO • « • ' . d a y of>_ 
Name_ 
1 9 8 . 
«rr* x. 
, Q A . M . CXT>M. 
S t r e e t , 2& V </ 
(Please print) / First • ' " ( Middle 
C i t y . i-a*?**-1-
A g e 
Di 
' < B i r th D o , , ' ' - * ' < g ^ 
. S t a t e . t-1 *G *\ 
. S e x r Q / A a l e - _ • e m a l e 
. S t a t e . 
Veh. Lie. No. 
M a k e . -V.X . S t y l e , 0 0 / P' 
\ 
- C T ^ ) p e r . Q-Cha i^ f . 
. Y e o r ^ 
Upon a publ ic h i ghway , name ly at ( l o c a t i o n ) . 
. Coloir , 
/<<£? JC7K A - ^ClfJ 
d id un law fu l l y ope ra te the above desc r ibed veh ic le in the c i ty , county and state a f o r e s a i d and d i d 
then and there commit the f o l l o w i n g o f f ense : 
•S < 
o 
v 
SPEEDING m p .h . in m.p .h . zone. 
nproper LEFT TURN • No s igna l a cu Q From 
w r o n g l ane 
Improper RIGHT TURN Q No s i g n a l ri In to w r o n g 
lane 
j—j F rom w r o n g 
l one 
Q Disobeyed TRAFFIC Q F lash ing r e d 
CONTROL S IGNAL 
O Steady r e d 
O Improper back ing 
O Too fast for ex i s t i ng cond i t i c 
Disobeyed STOP SIGN Q W r o n g p lace Q W o , k *P«?ed Q Faster 
Improper PASSING Q A t In te rsec t ion 
n A t P e d . 
X w a l k 
Q Cut m 
Q Across 
physical ba r . 
a W r o n g l ane 
• O n r i g h t 
FAILURE TO YIELD • Ped. Q V e h . FOLLOWING TOO CLOSiLY Q 
Othe r v io la t i ons : (descr ibe) ^ 2 ^ ,/JV 
^ v ,>e J Xe£rj j-Kz / ^ ^ y / H , - - _ » « * — " — c • * - * • * • • - _ - . . • _ • I , * 
in vtolajrfon of the (State Sta tu te) ( C i t y / t ) r d i nance) in such c a s e \ * 6 a d e a n d p r o v i d e d . 
35-
SLIPPERY 
PAVEMENT 
OARKNESS 
a 
a 
a 
• 
D 
D 
a 
• a 
a 
a 
AREA: l_T"fcus.ness 
H I G H W A Y TYPE: • 
Rain 
Snow 
Ice 
N i g h t 
Fog 
Snow 
OTHER TRAFFIC 
PRESENT 
\ \ ' 
_>' 
CAUSED PERSON ' * V 
TO DODGE V ^ j 
3 Pedes t r ian 
T3r\ver 
JUST MISSED 
ACCIDENT 
PD • PI C Fata l 
Ped. Q V e h 
Hi t f i x e d ob jec t 
Right A n g l e 
Q T J U S . I 
Cross 
O n c o m i n g 
Pedes t r i an 
Same D i rec t i on 
P I I n d u s t r i a l 
2 l ane • 3 l ane 
D School 
n I l one 
H e a d on * 
a S idesw ipe 
• Ran off Road 
• " I n t e r s e c t i o n 
Rear e n d 
• Res ident ia l 
O r T fane d i v i d e d 
I cer t i fy that a copy of this summons w a s d u l y se rved u p o n the d e f e n d a n t a c c o r d i n o to l a w on 
the a b o v e da te a n d I k n o w or b e l i e v e a n d so a l l e g e that the a b o v e - n a m e d d e f e n d a n t d i d 
c o m m i t the o f fense he re in set fo r th con t ra ry t o l a w . I f u r the r cert i fy that^ lne xbuc f to w h i c h the 
d e f e n d a n t has b e e n d i rec ted to a p p e a r is the p roper c o u r ^ p u m j o r r f ^ l c i Section 77-7-21 
(SK. 77-7-19). ' ' ^ * " 
Sworn and subscr ibed to be fo re me 
(Signature and identification of*. -A. 
officer or other complainant) -
2/?Cr 
COURT APPEARANCE 198- 2a,i^'i^:-apM. 
ADDRESS OF COURT & CLERK OFFICE: 14 _ _ _ _ _ 
: PROMISE JO APPEAR IN SAID C O U R I E R BUREAU AT SAID TIME A N D PLACE to answer to the 
above charge , and fu r ther a g r e e to w a i v e - t h e f i l i n g of a v»erifjed i n f o r m a t i o n a n d elec* that the. 
b rosecu f ion m a y p roceed u p o n this w r i t t e n su j xupo* * to appetsr: • 
I 
OO 
PO 
Cn 
CD 
CASE NC DOCKET NO PAGE NO 
Date COURT ACTION AND OTHER ORDERS 
"•" ^ vvith P mr-yrra or *"a£ Deenexa^ J nere c o oracle cau^t r 
Ba ir a r^ i n* c i tc^i f ~ ~*0 ~ °~ r ~^i <>cnen . e 
Bai r^r^tr S jna* re c U ^ ' 
f imn .q^^o ?r U 3sr -
d,- n iMnm rr n ^ n n 
St Yi one; q«tift.i q l..rnp.. 
, i r^nr c?.. IPH ^
 r n p~ 
^ np<=anc 
Uetep^?p* arraion«c 
n
 w r ^ » c r s Chts • P ea 
i i a e <*c* 1k / o ' . 
j u D Nbt 3 J I ! ' \ 
QS a __ 
r^qu*3 t o "* D 
D -1 r in T-n aooearan^e o Tna • 
wJ H D D J o , C 
^ L ~sent ^ , 
p
 0 ~ ^ j n grjr^r^tj^ 
r
 -o ru Ov v^our* 
- J nc , JU'V 
^ : L t n^rrrore enters PIP foi CM *n orov> 
r
^°"
1
 Suspended $ 
. aavs n ine County Ja . cavs s u s p e n d " u.or pav~*-° o 
' I V 
. uav o 
M a eo K Mdr9 Df ° r
 w ^  * ^
r
 £ 
p prm^diate D V a x n !L 
i 
S g^ature c' uudgt. ^ CLrk 
d j ^ • "V*1 s 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF CACHE ?r^ - if* s 
THE DEFENDANT IS HEREBY 
GIVEN NOTICE TO APPEAR BEFORE 
JUDGE O f V * ~ ' V ^fZ^, 
LOCATED AT /*& X^fo A>«> >-^^-
££-£* DAY OF ON OR BEFORE THE 
Y+**y ,19 f<? 
AT THE HOUR OF /.'c»*> 
IN THE ^yt^ &'*•*- '•A 
P.M. 
COURT. 
FOR COURT USE ONLY 
DATE OF CONVICTION/FORFEITURE 
FINE SUSPENDED 
JAIL SUSPENDED 
PLEA/FINDING 
D Guilty 
D No Contest 
D Not Guilty 
D Forfeited Bail 
SEVERITY 
Q Minimum 
D Intermediate 
D Maximum 
Signature of Judge or Clerk Required 
DLD 
USE 
CACHE COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE 
UNIFORM CITATION OR INFORMATION 
AND NOTICE TO APPEAR 
5ENO. 
CITATION NO. A456817 
Name 
~2 (Last) /£^*^/ (First) (Middle) 
Address 
Place of Birth 
(City) (State) 
DOB 
Driver License No. 
Picture ID 
Q£Yes D No 
hide Color 
ffy Nurr 
<Ut+/y 
(Zip) 
Social Securff mber 
State 
Vehicle Year 
Ht. wt. 
Phone 
Hair 
Vehicle Make 
Vehicle License No. 
TVpe 
Eyes Race 
State 
Model 
THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT IS CHARGED WITH VIOLATING: 
UT I CO | CY 
x 4* <fcy* # 
(^xfi/^rJ &g)^he+-/r<-
Location 
Code* 
W-* v& 
W-/'/t> 
Expires 
Accident 
Y /JW 
Misd. 
Cit. Traf. 
K 
4L 
I CERTIFY THAT COPt OF THIS CITATION O R INFORMATION WAS DULY SERVED UPON THE 
DEFENDANT ACCORDING TO LAW ON THE ABOVE DATE AND I KNOW OR BELIEVE AND SO 
ALLEGE THAT THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT DID COMMIT THE OFFENSE HEREIN SET 
FORTH CONTRARY TO LAW. I FURTHER CERTIFY THAT THE COURT TO WHICH THE DEFENDANT 
HAS BEEN DIRECTED TO APPEAR IS THE PROPER COURT PURSUANT TO SECTION 77-7-19. 
OFF.P.FR CJ9 ^ J < ^ M ^ ^ 
P.OMPl AINANT 
DATF , 19 
ID # . < 3 
ID # . 
MISD. CIT.-BCI 
TRAFFIC-COURT 
Date Sent to DLD Docket No. 
RIGHT INDEX 
U N I h U K I Y l C I I A I I U N A I N U 
NOTICE TO APPEAR ISSUED BY: UTAH HIGHWAY PATROL 
V J I / M I W I N nv**. 
B 262294 
P^' STATE OF UTAH 
LlKcOUNTY OF. ssjy<-
D CITY OF 
THE DEFENDANT IS HEREBY 
GIVEN NOTICE TO APPEAR IN: 
COURT OF • • f r l , . j '-.•^^^J? 
LOCATED AT 
/ 
/ "n AJ •co LJ • 
*„ •> 
'-&*. La/ 2«3Z.' 
- ^ ~ - ^ 
Not less than (5) five nor more than (J 4)fourteen days after issuance o f 
this citation, ( s e e ^ j ^ f f ^ j j c i ^ o j ^ i l e ^ ^ 
information). 
FOR COURT USE ONLY 
DATE OF CONVICTION/FORFEITURE 
FINE SUSPENDED 
JAIL . SUSPENDED . 
D Guilty 
D N o Contest 
• Not Guilty 
• Forfeited Bail 
PLEA/FINDING SEVERITY 
Q Minimum 
D Intermediate 
D Maximum 
NAME (Last) (First) 
*\„As*u*>j£. 
ADDRESS 
(Middle) 
(City) 
;/*><? AJ- /7<;o f. / 
Driver License N o . .. -
Vehicle Color Vehicle Year 
State 
^ V " (*>L/\ 
ftate) 
L 
DOB 7* 
U 
Vehicle License N a 
AJ 
Ust^ 
Type 
JA 'JU>v 
ZIP 
?V5^/ 
State , [Expires 
uLAm 
Accident 
R N 
D» 
N £, *V 
THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT IS CHARGED WITH VIOLATING: , 
OUTAH CODE • COUNTY CODE • CITY CODE NO: J _ ^ ± _ ^ 
O N . . > < * - l ^ - l C THE Y DAY OF / J / . ^ _ v ^ J > ^ - _ .. • -
(day of week) » /*^*» — ' 
L O C A T I O N . 
MILITARY TIME . 
'. <". .' ,....,.- .-' i.-^ <S'X,*-~**S < ^ A W / MILE POST NO. _ 
VIOLATION(S): i ^ ^ 
^ ^ 
Speeding . . mph in a . T <T . Zone 
MPH - , -
OVER / 5 INTERSTATE: D YES tw<o 
STOP S I G N 
F S 
WITHOUT ADMITTING GUILT I PROMISE TO APPEAR AS DIRECTED HEREIN: 
X / , . ' . - ! S , * V •'•• SIGNATURE. 
/ 
I CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THIS CITATION OR INFORMATION (SUMMONS A N D COMPLAINT) WAS DULY SERVED UPON THE DE-
FENDANT ACCORDING TO LAW O N THE ABOVE DATE A N D I K N O W OR BELIEVE AND SO ALLEGE THAT THE ABOVE N A M E D DEFEN-
DANT DID COMMIT THE OFFENSE HEREIN SET FORTH CONTRARY TO LAW. I FURTHER CERTIFY THAT THE COURT TO WHICH T, ~->' 
DANT HAS BEEN DIRECTED TO APPEAR IS THE PROPEftGOURT PURSUANT TO SECTION 7 7 - 7 - 2 1 (77-7-19) . 
OFFICER 
DATE 
L - ^ -:^^ . BADGE # zz / ' 
A D . 1 9 . 
®M 
DLD 
USE DEFENDANT COPY 
DATE SENT TO DLD DOCKET N Q 
TabB 
L(±W 
Circuit Court, State of Utah 
CACHE COUNTY, LOGAN DEPARTMENT 
LOGAN CITY Plaintiff 
vs. 
Defendant(s) No. 
BENCH 
WARRANT 
8 2 5 4 6 KAREN THATCHER 
2 6 9 4 Id 1800 S 
LOGAN UT. 84321 
THE STATE OF UTAH TO ANY PEACE OFFICER IN THE STATE OF UTAH: 
The above-named defendant failed to appear on the date of 9 / 1 8 / 8 7 
in violation of: 
• Defendant's obligation to appear for • arraignment; • trial; D sentencing. 
•XA written promise to appear. 
• A summons. 
• A court order requiring defendant to appear for supplemental hearing, or an order to show 
cause. 
YOU ARE THEREFORE COMMANDED to arrest the above-named defendant forthwith and bring him 
before this court; or if the court has adjourned, to deliver him to the custody of the sheriff of the 
above-named county until the court is next in session. 
Bail is set in the amount of $ 10 0 . 0 0 . The warrant is returnable on the first Tuesday after 
execution at 9 AM, and defendant is ordered to appear on said date. 
Issued under the seal of this court on the date of 1 0 / 2 8 / 8 7 
BY ORDER OF THE COURT 
Clerk of the Circuit Court 
Ry J ^<J?riJ<yx^ 
(7 Deputy uty Clerk 
RETURN OF SERVICE 
I received the above bench warrant on the date of 
the same by arresting the defendant and bringing the defendai 
the date of 
, and served 
jail of the above ( 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF CACHE, LOGAN CITY DEPARTMENT 
LOGAN CITY, fo®V5/-cA 
P l a i n t i f f ) I N F O R M A T I O N 
v s . 
No. 82546 
KAREN THATCHER 
D e f e n d a n t } 
The undersigned, under oath, states on information and belief 
that the above named Defendant committed the crime of FAILURE TO APPEA.R, 
a Class C Misdemeanor, an Logan, Utah, on 9/18/87 
in violation of Section 42-15-32 of the Revised Ordinances of Logan City. 
The acts of the Defendant constituting the offense are as follows: 
That the Defendant did give a written promise to appear in the 
Circuit Court, State of Utah, County of Cache, on or before the 
date above listed after having been arrested for a violation of the Logan 
City Code, and did fail to appear in said Court on or before said date. 
This information is based on evidence obtained from the following 
witnesses: 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this '->U day of 
1 ' CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE 
Crd 1987 
S^^/JT^ 
Cache County Sheriff '& Oft ice 
Jail Division 
Bail Receipt Number : 2671 
I, Ri char- as D, heresy certify that on ll/14/b7 
I received from Syde Thatcher the amount 
oi $100.00 as a bond pending the appearance of 
Karen Thatcher in the 2ND CIRC LOG 
on 11/24/87 at 09:00, to answer to the charge(s) stated below and 
at ail times thereafter to hold himself amenable to the order and 
process ai the court, 
OFFENSES: 
Date 
11/14/37 
Statute Code 
42-17-lb 
O-F-fense Description 
Fai1-Appear, Traff i c 
Bail Amount 
*100.00 
^ 
bid Groll 
Sheri ff 
B\ 
( Richards D ) 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
CCUNTY OF CACHE, LOGAN CITY DEPARTMENT 
LOGAN CITY, ) 
P l a i n t i f f I N F O R M A T I O N 
v s . ) gfrOQr/- c A 
THATCHER, Karen L. 
2694 tfest 1800 South 
Logan, Utah 
4/3/68 
Defendant ) 
The undersigned, ALAN NELSON under oath, states en the information 
and belief that the above named Defendant conrnitted the crime (s) of: 
COUNT 1: EXPIRED REGISTRATION (CLASS C MISDEMEANOR) 
CGCNT 2: FAILURE TO APPEAR (CLASS E MISDEMEANOR) 
at Logan, Utah on 9/4/87 & 11/5/87 in violation of the following 
sections of the Revised Ordinances of Logan City: 
42/15/36 42/17/1 (b) 
That, contrary to Logan City Ordinances, Defendant's acts 
constituting the offense were: 
COUNT 1: That the Defendant did drive or permit a motor vehicle to be 
driven, stopped or parked on the streets or alleys of the City of Logan 
without vehicle displaying in proper position valid and unexpired 
registration plates or indication of registration meeting the 
requirements of the laws of the State of Utah. Class C Misdenveanor 
COUNT 2: That, contrary to the ordinances of Logan City, the Defendant 
failed to appear before the Judge of the Circuit Court, Logan City 
Department, after having given \/ritten premise to appear at said Court 
on the 18th day of September, 1987 at 10:00 am, to an officer upon 
arrest for a traffic violation. Class B Misdemeanor 
This information is based on evidence obtained frcrn the following 
witnesses: 
J. LISCNBEE LCPD 
J. Bahadori 
Authorized for presentment & filing 
CCMPIATNANT 
^^
 z Subscri^d & sworn to before me ^ .^^  
Logan City Prosecutor /Attorney this ^ < 3 a y of AJAC^^ 19 o / 
DAMAGES: YES 
CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE 
S E C O N D CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY O F CACHE, LOGAN CITY D E P A R T M E N T 
140 NORTH 1ST WEST 
P.O. BOX 291 
LOGAN, UTAH 84321 
THEODORE S. PERRY, JUDGE 
DAVID W. SORENSON, JUDGE 
Attorney David R. Daines 
UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY Box 132 8 
LOGAN, UTAH, 84321 
ARLENE HUTCHISON, CLERK OF THE COURT 
TELEPHONE NUMBERS: 801-752-6893 
801-752-6894 
December 10 , 19 87 801-752-6895 
^ $ 6 4\T/~ CA 
Dear Attorney Daines: 
Enclosed find a copy of the amended information filed in 
the case of Logan City v. Karen L. Thatcher No. 87 2001 564 
which combines the offense on the citation of expired registration 
with the original failure to appear information filed October 
30, 1987. 
The matter is set for trial on Wednesday, January 27, 1988 
at 9:00 a.m. A formal written request for a jury is on file. 
Sincerely yours 
.//J A IS 
IxrcrvLt Judge 
(^'U 
DAVID RA1NEY DAINES 
ATTQBN EY-AT-LAW 
U2U ODX 12 28 
LOGAN, UTAH G 4 3 2 2 
Telephone (801) 753-2721 
%yoqshCA 
larch 25, 1988 
Judge Parley R. Baldwin 
Circuit Judge 
2605 Washington Boulevard 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Re: Logan City vs. Karen Thatcher in Logan, Cache, Utah Circuit Court; 
Criminal No. 82546. 
Dear Judge Baldwin: 
The above entitled case was set for a jury trial and continued without 
date with the understanding that when you made certain rulings on the scope of 
relevant admissible evidence you would arrange for a trial setting. I am 
wondering if somehow you may have overlooked this matter which is extremely 
urgent to my client. 
As I have explained clearly to you, we consider that these inordinate 
delays have and are continuing to deny ray client her right to speedy jury 
trial. 1 would appreciate hearing from you regarding these matters. 
David Rbdney Daines 
sw 
pc : VScott B a r r e t t 
Nelda Hollingsworth 
C« 
0J1 
) f-ft 
FIRST CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH, P?#4/ 'S f~CA 
LOGAN DEPARTMENT 
LOGAN CITY, ) 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ) 
KAREN THATCHER, ] 
Defendant. ] 
i D E C I S I O N 
i Civil No: 82546 
The remaining preliminary matter before the Court, 
prior to the jury trial on the Information alleging expired 
registration and failure to appear, deals with plaintiff's 
motion to restrict evidence and testimony, solely to the 
allegations that the defendant operated a vehicle in Logan City 
with an expired registration and failed to appear. 
The Court has heard the profer and the theories of the 
defense as presented by defendant's counsel. Counsel has 
expressed a desire to present evidence to the jury as it 
relates to the procedures in issuing warrants for arrest, the 
contents of citations, the Judiciary's interference or 
participation and other matters that relate primarily to 
actions taken which have little, if anything, to do with 
whether or not the defendant violated the expired registration 
and/or failure to appear laws. 
Logan City vs. Karen Thatcher %%&" 
Case No: 82546 
Page Two 
Defects to which counsel has addressed are matters of 
law which are to be ruled on by the Court when properly 
presented and are not in the scope of the jury's fact finding 
mission. 
At the trial, to be held before a jury, the Court and 
jury will hear the relevant evidence as set out in Rule 401 and 
402 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, Further, the parties will 
be restricted by Rule 403 which provides for the exclusion of 
relevant evidence on grounds of prejudice, confusion, or waste 
of time. 
The Court does not intend to allow either party to 
present evidence to the jury regarding the subsequent arrest of 
the defendant, the validity of the pleadings, and all evidence 
on court procedures and all evidence will be restricted as set 
forth in the above-cited rules. 
The jury will hear relevant evidence of expired 
registration and failure to appear. 
This case, which normally would be heard in a 1/2 day 
setting, is to be set for one full day jury setting and counsel 
should be prepared to complete the case in that time frame. 
DATED this V day of May, 1988. 
COURT 
Parley R£ ga/Ldwin 
Circuit Court Judge 
STATE TAX i . SIGNER • MOTOR VEHICLE DIVISION 
MAIM G r r l C « ^ _
- -
. 5 .'.'.OTOR AVENUE 
SALT LAKE CiTTIlTAH 34116 
TELEPHONE 533-5311 
EXPIRES^
 J U L - l l f l f l 
C REGISTRATION C E R T ^ C A T E T ) 
MUST BE CARRIED IN VEHICLE . TIMES 
NOT VALID UNTIL STAMPED ANw,UMBERED 
UTAtHPtATENUMBE 
AKUOET 
KXS?"5 THATCHER'SID 
STREET Eb^M Id IflOD SOUTH 
ADDRESS 
P.O. BOX 
LOGAN 
CITY STATE 
UT 
ZIP CODE 
BM321 
COUNTY 
03 
VEHICLE IDENTIFICATION N O 
lVUAG017BFV03eMcJ0 
[TYPE 
PR 
MAKE 
VOLK 
BODY STYLE CYLS GROSS WT (COM) FUEL 
D 
ASSESSMENT CC^E 
INS 
OWNER'S 
SIGNAT ~77^Trh&^, 
POL! 
FORM TC-657A 
^ 
cf 
JURATION FEES ) 1 i X ^ j ( CK FEE SCHEDULE 
'Motorcycl J $ 7.50 
'Trucks ***** (See Schedule) 
Trailers (over 750 lbs.) $10.00 
Small Trailers (750 lbs. or less 
unladen weight) & 7.5C 
Passenger cars and four-wheel! 
Gross 
Weight 
6-9 Mo. 
Annual 80% 
trucks not operated for compensGtJUh *^r 
am 
Wf1 
sQtJOh-9 
for hire, are allowed a combinedO,cjrds$ 
wetght of 10,000 pounds when operj^ag \r& 
combination wilh trailer. 4*CX Cr 
The gioss laden weight (over 6,0GjjJ) 
pounds^ for which a vehicle is 
must be legibly painted or" s 
sidt"»s of the power unit in fi 
inches or more in height 
Partial year registration expires the last 
day of the registration period for which 
issued. 
'Plus a Driver's Education Tax. 
ON SALE OR DISPOSAL OF THIS VEHICLE 
REMOVE YOUR LICENSE PLATES. 
NOTIFY THIS DIVISION WITHIN 10 DAYS 
OF ANY CHANGE OF ADDRESS. 
mwjgl 
80,000 is legal load limit without overtax 
permit from highway patrol 
